Birthing Barbarism: The Unconstitutionality of Shackling Pregnant Prisoners by Griggs, Claire Louise
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 8
2011
Birthing Barbarism: The Unconstitutionality of
Shackling Pregnant Prisoners
Claire Louise Griggs
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Women Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Griggs, Claire Louise. "Birthing Barbarism: The Unconstitutionality of Shackling Pregnant Prisoners." American University Journal of
Gender Social Policy and Law 20, no. 1 (2011): 247-271.
GRIGGS 11/29/2011 11/30/2011 4:32:45 PM 
 
247 
BIRTHING BARBARISM:                       
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SHACKLING PREGNANT PRISONERS 
CLAIRE LOUISE GRIGGS* 
I.  Introduction ...........................................................................................248 
II.  Background ..........................................................................................249 
 A.  America’s Shackling Epidemic.................................................249 
 B.  Shackling on a Case by Case Basis...........................................251 
 1.  Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia ..........................251 
 2.  Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services ...........................252 
 C.  The Health Implications of and Justifications for Shackling ....253 
 D.  Medical Standards of Care for Prisoners ..................................253 
III. Analysis ...............................................................................................255 
 A.  Shackling Deprives Prisoners of Their Constitutionally 
Guaranteed Level of Medical Care Under Estelle v. 
Gamble. ...................................................................................255 
 B.  Shackling is Unconstitutional In Violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. ............................................................................259 
 1.  Shackling Laws Are Unconstitutional Under Nelson v. 
Correctional Medical Services...........................................259 
 2.  The Court in Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia 
Should Have Found That Shackling Laws are 
Unconstitutional.................................................................262 
 C.  Illinois, California, and New York Have All Outlawed 
Shackling and Other States Should Follow Their Model 
and Move Towards Passing Legislation that Also Outlaws 
Shackling. ................................................................................263 
 1.  Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by the 
                                                          
* Managing Editor, Vol. 20, American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & 
the Law; J.D. Candidate, May 2012, American University, Washington College of 
Law; B.A. 2009, Northwestern University.  Thank you to my editor, Sarah Comeau, for 
her continued guidance throughout the writing process.  A big thank you to the Journal 
staff, especially J.P. Bodri, R. Roberti, and A. Fox, for their unyielding patience, hard 
work, and dedication in preparing this Article. Most of all, thank you to my family for 
their steadfast love, support, and encouragement throughout the years. 
1
Griggs: Birthing Barbarism: The Unconstitutionality of Shackling Pregnant
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
GRIGGS 11/29/2011 11/30/2011  4:32:45 PM 
248 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:1 
Illinois Law and Enact Laws Banning Shackling. .............264 
 2.  Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by 
California Law and Enact Laws Banning Shackling. ........265 
 3.  Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by 
New York Law and Enact Laws Banning Shackling.........267 
IV. Policy Recommendations ....................................................................268 
V.  Conclusion ...........................................................................................270 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While public opinion largely dictates that shackling is too barbaric for 
civilized society, it happens with frightening frequency.1  A majority of 
states shackle female prisoners during childbirth; forty states allow the 
shackling of female prisoners during labor, delivery, and post-partum 
recovery.2  Some women give birth alone in their cells, despite statutes 
dictating that these women must receive medical attention.3  While 
shackling is illegal in several states, such as Illinois, California, and New 
York, these efforts are not sufficient because far too many states legalize 
the practice.4  Further, even in states where shackling is illegal, waves of 
lawsuits claiming that shackling practices continue are prevalent despite the 
laws banning the practice.5 
However, there are encouraging times ahead, as states such as Tennessee 
and Georgia are drafting legislation prohibiting shackling.6  Recently, in 
                                                          
 1. See Editorial, One Protection for Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at A30, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/opinion/14wed3.html?_r=1 (defining 
shackling as the practice of placing women in leg shackles, handcuffs, and a belly chain 
with a box that connects the handcuffs and belly chain). 
 2. See Colleen Mastony, Childbirth in Chains, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2010, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-18/news/ct-met-shackled-mothers-
20100718_1_shackles-handcuffs-labor (contending that most sheriff officials consider 
labor to be only the moments immediately before birth).  But cf. Reviewed by Louise 
Chang MD, Normal Labor and Delivery Process, WEBMD, Feb. 1, 2010, at 1, 
available at http://www.webmd.com/baby/guide/normal-labor-and-delivery-process 
(considering labor to begin whenever contractions start, known as the latent stage). 
 3. See Rachel Roth, Pregnant, in Prison and Denied Care, THE NATION, Dec. 21, 
2009, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/pregnant-prison-and-denied-care 
(recounting various situations in which prison officials denied inmates proper medical 
attention during labor). 
 4. See generally AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE USA (2001) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE 
OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY] (giving state by state reports of statutes outlining shackling 
policies). 
 5. See Mastony, supra note 2 (reporting that since 2008, more than twenty former 
female inmates have filed lawsuits against the Cook County Sheriff’s office alleging 
incidents of shackling while giving birth). 
 6. See Jane E. Allen, Shackled: Women Behind Bars Deliver in Chains Federal 
Prisons Ban Practice, But 40 States Still Allow Shackling of Incarcerated Pregnant 
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the landmark decision Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared shackling 
unconstitutional and in violation of the Eighth Amendment.7 
This Comment argues that pro-shackling laws are unconstitutional, 
violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment because shackling not only causes excessive physical pain, it 
deprives prisoners of a constitutionally guaranteed level of medical care.8  
Part II discusses the history of shackling, its prevalence and health 
implications, and the statutory medical standards of care for prisoners.9  
Part III argues that states that currently allow shackling are employing what 
should be illegal methods in violation of the U.S. Constitution.10  Part IV 
discusses how other states should implement anti-shackling legislation.11  
Finally, Part V concludes that the Nelson Court and state statutes 
prohibiting shackling could provide a foundation for courts interpreting 
state statutes that permit shackling to find this practice unconstitutional.12 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  America’s Shackling Epidemic 
The majority of female inmates shackled during labor are non-violent 
offenders and are not considered flight risks.13  Samantha L., a Wisconsin 
                                                          
Women, ABC NEWS MED. UNIT, Oct. 21, 2010, at 3, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/WomensHealth/pregnant-shackled-women-bars-deliver-
chains/story?id=11933376&page=1 (noting that there are still some legislative 
setbacks, like in California where Gov. Schwarzenegger vetoed a statute that would 
have extended the prohibition on shackling throughout an inmate’s pregnancy). 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (declaring it illegal to inflict cruel or unusual 
punishment).  See generally 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that 
shackling inflicts cruel and unusual punishment). 
 8. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d at 531-32 (holding that shackling is 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Constitution); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
845.6 (West 2011) (providing a statutory minimum standard of care for prisoners); 
D.C. CODE § 24-211.02 (2011) (providing a minimum standard of care for prisoners); 
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/4-105 (West 2011) (providing a statutory minimum 
standard of care for prisoners); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 508 (McKinney 2011). 
 9. See infra Part II (outlining that at the state level, no legal or medical 
justification exists for the use of shackling). 
 10. See infra Part III (arguing that states allowing shackling should recognize that it 
violates human decency, and adopt the legislative intent of states with anti-shackling 
legislation). 
 11. See infra Part IV (arguing that states like Tennessee and Georgia should follow 
the California and New York model to ensure that their shackling legislation is 
enforced). 
 12. See infra Part V (applying the standards set forth in Estelle and Nelson, stating 
that shackling violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 13. See Allen, supra note 6 (noting that the majority of women in prison today are 
there for drug offenses or other non-violent crimes). 
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inmate, gave birth with her ankles shackled eighteen inches apart.14  Her 
shackles remained in place until moments before the actual birth of her 
child.15 
Inmate Latiana W. is one of several suing the Cook County, Illinois, 
Sheriff’s Office for using restraints on prisoners in labor, contrary to 
Illinois law.16  Despite multiple objections from her attending physician, 
the corrections officer present during Latiana’s labor refused to remove the 
restraints.17  As a result, her physician could not administer an epidural.18  
Being shackled also hindered her childbirth, as Latiana could not properly 
position her legs to push out the placenta.19 
Another horrifying experience happened in Florida’s Collier County 
Jail.20  In this case, Joan repeatedly pleaded for medical help because she 
began leaking amniotic fluid, but officers denied and ignored her.21  By the 
time she finally received an ultrasound—two weeks later—her doctor 
informed her that she had leaked out all of her amniotic fluid and, as a 
result, her fetus’s skull had collapsed.22 
It is unclear exactly how and why the practice of shackling originated, 
but many historians believe the practice began in the 1970s when criminal 
justice facilities began adopting gender-neutral policies.23  The main 
justifications for shackling are maintaining security and decreasing flight 
                                                          
 14. Press Release, Amnesty Int’l USA, States Policies Fail to Protect Women From 
Sexual Misconduct in Prison, Allow Shackling During Pregnancy & Labor, Amnesty 
International Finds (Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-
bin/print.cgi?file=/news2006/0302-06.htm (stating how doctors required that Samantha 
pace for several hours while in labor with her ankles shackled leaving them raw). 
 15. See id. (recounting when the corrections officer permanently appointed to stand 
guard in her room finally removed the shackles). 
 16. See Mastony, supra note 2 (revealing how Latiana is one of the twenty inmates 
to come forward since 2008 to accuse Cook County of continuing to use these practices 
contrary to Illinois law). 
 17. See id. (stating how the corrections officer removed the shackles only ten 
minutes before the actual birth of Latiana’s son and then replaced them immediately 
afterward). 
 18. See id. (describing the unnecessary and excessive pain Latiana experienced 
during her labor). 
 19. See id. (noting how the immediate replacement of the shackles resulted in 
Latiana not being able to safely finish her delivery). 
 20. See Roth, supra note 3 (illustrating the total lack of regard for proper inmate 
care through repeatedly denied requests for medical attention). 
 21. See id. (showing how in this case, the prisoner did not even have the luxury of 
being shackled to a bed). 
 22. See id. (recounting that continued denial of medical care on behalf of jail 
officials, even after diagnosis of fetal death, caused staggering increase in threat of 
septic shock and death). 
 23. See Mastony, supra note 2 (noting that because male prisoners are shackled 
during any type of hospitalization, including surgery, this practice was then applied to 
female prisoners during childbirth). 
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risk.24  However, the justifications for shackling pale in comparison to the 
severe damage and degradation it causes.25  What is clear is that shackling 
affects a significant amount of women.26  The shackling policies 
themselves hearken back to an era that considered convicted women 
morally subhuman and especially condemned any evidence of sexual 
activity.27  Many jurisdictions failed to modify these restraint policies to 
accommodate pregnancy.28  Shackling policies that consider the differences 
between male and female inmates recognize that the shackling of female 
inmates is less necessary.29  For example, women are more likely than men 
to be serving time for a drug offense, and less likely to be serving time for a 
violent crime.30 
B.  Shackling on a Case by Case Basis 
1.  Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia 
A group of female prisoners sued the District of Columbia prisons in 
Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, alleging widespread Eighth 
Amendment violations regarding the conditions of confinement for female 
inmates.31  The D.C. Circuit Court reaffirmed that the only deprivations 
that triggered Eighth Amendment scrutiny “are deprivations of essential 
human needs.”32  The court amended the trial court’s ruling that shackling 
                                                          
 24. See id. (noting that women in labor are a much lower safety and flight risk than 
other prisoners). 
 25. See Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/national/02shackles.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Ada
m+Liptak&st=nyt (arguing that shackling laws that seek to protect security officers 
from a woman in labor, who has no previous history of violence, is not a legitimate 
justification for shackling her). 
 26. See id. (noting an estimated five percent of women incarcerated in state prisons 
and three percent of women incarcerated in federal prisons are pregnant upon 
admission, resulting in approximately 2,000 births per year). 
 27. See L. MARA DODGE, WHORES AND THIEVES OF THE WORST KIND: A STUDY OF 
WOMEN, CRIMES, AND PRISONS, 1835-2000, 30 (2002) (describing female penitentiary 
inmates as unredeemable). 
 28. See Matony, supra note 2 (aligning the origin of shackling with the creation of 
gender neutral policies resulting in the shackling of both male and female prisoners 
when being transported to a hospital regardless of their condition). 
 29. See DODGE, supra note 27, at 30 (noting that women have shorter, less violent 
criminal histories than men; while more than half of male prisoners have committed 
two or fewer offenses, compared to two-thirds of female prisoners); see also Mastony 
supra note 2 (noting that most women in Cook County are in jail for nonviolent 
crimes). 
 30. See id. (noting that men are twice as likely as women to be violent recidivists). 
 31. See generally 93 F.3d 910, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (alleging violations of various 
statutory and constitutional provisions such as sexual abuse of prisoners and inadequate 
medical care). 
 32. See id. at 928 (quoting Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836 (D.C. 
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violates the Eighth Amendment, and rejected the provision that prisons 
have written protocols regarding the use of restraints on pregnant women.33  
While the District of Columbia Department of Corrections’ (DOC) protocol 
supposedly prohibits the use of restraints during labor, delivery, and 
recovery, unless the woman has demonstrated a history of violent behavior, 
the District of Columbia (D.C.) has no actual legislation limiting the use of 
shackling on pregnant inmates.34  Thus, pursuant to Women Prisoners and 
current law, D.C. has some limits on the practice of shackling, but does not 
ban the practice outright.35 
2.  Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services 
More recent is the notable anti-shackling case of Nelson v. Correctional 
Medical Services, where the court strengthened constitutional protections 
against shackling methods.36  The pregnant prisoner in Nelson entered the 
Arkansas prison system on June 3, 2003, for credit fraud.37  On September 
20, 2003, she started experiencing labor pains; upon arrival at the hospital, 
the officer shackled her to a wheelchair and wheeled her to the maternity 
ward.38  At more than seven centimeters dilated, the officer then shackled 
Nelson to a bed.39  The Eighth Circuit held that the law “clearly 
established” that shackling a woman prisoner during labor and delivery 
violated the Eighth Amendment, imposing cruel and unusual punishment.40  
The court also discussed the standard of confinement and medical care, and 
found that the security officer acted with deliberate indifference.41  The 
                                                          
Cir. 1988)). 
 33. See id. at 932, 944 (vacating an order requiring prison officials to develop a 
written protocol for prenatal care, reasoning that the District Court did not have 
supplemental jurisdiction as to this issue). 
 34. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 321 
(reporting policies in D.C. based on DOC responses to Amnesty International’s 
surveys). 
 35. See Movement Builds to Stop Shackling Pregnant Prisoners, CRIME REP., Aug. 
31, 2009, http://thecrimereport.org/2009/08/31/movement-builds-tostop-shackling-
pregnant-prisoners (noting that suggested limits certainly do not carry the same effect 
as actual legislation). 
 36. See generally 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (detailing the case of 
Shawanna Nelson). 
 37. See id. at 522 (noting that Nelson was incarcerated for a non-violent offense). 
 38. See id. at 525-26 (noting that the officer later testified that Nelson remained 
shackled despite the fact that the officer never felt threatened by her or thought Nelson 
presented a escape risk). 
 39. See id. at 526 (noting that when a cervix has dilated seven centimeters that is 
well into the final stages of labor). 
 40. See id. at 522 (assuming no security justification existed for the restrains such 
as a history of violence). 
 41. See id. at 529 (noting how an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate 
indifference contains both a subjective and objective component). 
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court further noted that either interference with care, or infliction of 
unnecessary suffering establishes deliberate indifference in medical care 
cases in violation of the Eighth Amendment.42 
C.  The Health Implications of and Justifications for Shackling 
Shackling practices are degrading, barbaric, humiliating, and life 
threatening to both mother and child.43  Pregnant women are already more 
prone to tripping and falling because they have a different center of gravity: 
shackling their arms or ankles, therefore increases the risk of them falling 
on their stomachs.44  In addition, labor and delivery are extremely 
unpredictable and waiting for a guard to remove a prisoner’s shackles can 
have dire consequences.45  For example, it is important that the delivering 
physician can quickly move and manipulate the mother to avoid potentially 
life-threatening emergencies.46  In Nelson, the prisoner suffered a hip 
dislocation and an umbilical hernia directly resulting from the shackles that 
prevented movement of the prisoner’s legs.47 
D.  Medical Standards of Care for Prisoners 
Several states have enacted legislation that prohibits shackling.48  In 
2000, Illinois passed legislation prohibiting the use of leg irons or shackles 
or waist shackles on any pregnant prisoner in labor.49  California followed 
in 2006, enacting a statute banning shackling unless it is strictly necessary 
for the safety of officers and the public.50  In 2009, New York similarly 
                                                          
 42. See id. at 532 (noting that the determination of interference with medical care, 
or the infliction of unnecessary suffering is an issue solely determined by the evidence 
in a specific case). 
 43. See Allen, supra note 6 (stating that shackling not only impedes a safe birth, 
but can cause immediate physical pain like raw ankles or wrists). 
 44. See id. (noting the potential for serious damage to the baby if the mother falls 
on her stomach). 
 45. See id. (listing consequences including, dropping of a baby’s heart rate, 
prohibiting the mother to change position to increase blood flow, or impeding a timely 
emergency c-section). 
 46. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (explaining that shackling is inherently dangerous 
to both mother and child). 
 47. See id. at 526 (stating that shackling caused a severe amount of pain and 
requiring additional surgery for both injuries). 
 48. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 13 
(identifying Illinois, as the first, and New York, as the most recent, states to pass such 
legislation). 
 49. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-15003.6 (West 2011) (prohibiting the use of 
shackles during the transportation of a female prisoner prior to delivering a baby). 
 50. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 6030 (West 2011) (establishing standards of health for 
pregnant women as well, such as a balanced diet and prenatal health care provided by a 
doctor). 
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banned the practice.51 
There exists no shortage of instances where officers deny pregnant 
inmates proper medical attention when the prisoners alert correctional 
officers that they are in labor.52  The Illinois code regarding failure to 
provide medical care to prisoners limits the liability of the public entity, 
except where the employee knows that a prisoner is in need of medical care 
and wantonly disregards the need.53  The statute strictly states that an 
employee observing that a prisoner is in need of immediate medical care 
must take reasonable action to summon such care.54  The California code is 
almost identical, providing that an employee is liable only if they know or 
have reason to know that a prisoner is in need of care and fail to try and 
provide such care.55  New York provides that it is within the discretion of 
the sheriff to determine if an inmate requires outside medical attention and 
if that outside treatment is necessary.56  Finally, the D.C. code specifies that 
the Department of Corrections shall have the power to provide for an 
inmate’s proper treatment and care.57 
Case law dictates the entitlement of inmates to specific standards of 
care.58  In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that deliberate 
indifference to a prisoner’s serious condition or injury constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.59  The Court clearly held that the government has an 
obligation to provide medical care to anyone incarcerated for the purpose 
                                                          
 51. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2011) (providing the most recently 
drafted anti-shackling legislation). 
 52. See, Mastony, supra note 2 (stating how inmates are often met with distrust and 
disbelief when they inform officers they are pregnant). 
 53. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/4-105 (West 2011) (applying this standard 
to the case of Latiana Watson where the correctional officer arguably knew that 
Watson needed medical care and that the shackles were impeding the proper 
administration of medical care, the officer could be found to have willfully and 
wantonly failed to take reasonable action by removing the shackles). 
 54. See id. (noting that an employee who disobeys the requirement to summon 
medical care is liable for injury proximately caused by lack of medical attention). 
 55. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.6 (West 2011) (applying persuasive authority such 
as the California statute, to a case such as that of Joan S. in Wisconsin, the correctional 
officers could be held liable for their blatant disregard for the health of a prisoner if 
Wisconsin were to adopt shackling legislation). 
 56. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 508 (requiring that in-prison treatment is 
insufficient to treat the prisoner). 
 57. See D.C. CODE § 24-211.02 (2011) (applying this standard to any case where 
shackling or lack of medical attention interferes with the safety and efficiency of 
childbirth). 
 58. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment ensures prisoners a minimum standard of medical care). 
 59. See id. at 97 (stating that while the Court ultimately found that deliberate 
indifference was not present, it did set forth a strict legal standard that prison officials 
cannot willfully deny prisoners care). 
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of punishment.60  The Court based the government’s obligation to provide 
medical care on an evolving standard of human decency that it says is the 
mark of a progressing and maturing society.61  The Court further held that 
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners is an 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment.62 
III. ANALYSIS 
A.  Shackling Deprives Prisoners of Their Constitutionally Guaranteed 
Level of Medical Care Under Estelle v. Gamble. 
Inmates still maintain constitutional rights while in prison.63  Prisoners 
have an unalienable constitutional right to medical care.64  The willful 
disregard of an inmate’s medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment.65  
In Estelle, the Supreme Court explained that the acts or omissions 
depriving an inmate of medical care must be sufficiently harmful so as to 
show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in order to be 
unconstitutional.66  This deliberate indifference constitutes a willful 
disregard of an inmate’s medical needs.67  Perhaps most notably, the Estelle 
Court concluded that the deliberate indifference standard applies where a 
prison guard intentionally denies or delays access to medical care, or 
intentionally interferes with the treatment a prisoner is prescribed.68  
                                                          
 60. See id. at 103 (stating that in the most extreme cases lack of attention to these 
medical needs can actually produce physical torture or lingering death, and in less 
severe cases may result in pain and suffering). 
 61. See id. at 102 (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)) 
(stating that the elements of this standard are broad and idealistic civilized standards, 
such as dignity, humanity, and decency). 
 62. See id. at 104 (noting that this standard holds true whether the indifference is 
manifested by a prison doctor in response to a prisoner’s needs, or by the prison guards 
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care). 
 63. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (holding that the status of 
“prisoner” curbs some constitutional rights in the interest of legitimate objectives such 
as deterrence of crime, rehabilitation, and internal security and order). 
 64. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (noting that denying an inmate medical care could 
result in pain and suffering which would not serve a legitimate penological purpose). 
 65. See id. (holding that serious medical needs of prisoners cannot be ignored 
under the Eighth Amendment). 
 66. See id. at 106 (stating that the Court is applying the Eighth Amendment 
conditions of confinement standard of deliberate indifference). 
 67. See id. (reasoning that deliberate indifference and willful disregard are both 
cruel and unusual, and therefore synonymous for the purposes of medical care under 
the Eighth Amendment). 
 68. See id. at 104 (noting that the infliction of such unnecessary suffering is 
inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern 
legislation codifying the common-law). 
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Essentially, Estelle provides an undeniable anti-shackling standard 
construed pursuant to the Constitution.69  An example of a flagrant 
violation of the standard set forth in Estelle is the case of nineteen-year-old 
Terra K., who pounded on the door to her cell as she went into labor, but 
prison guards ignored her and she ultimately gave birth alone in her cell.70 
This violates Estelle because the prison guards deliberately denied the 
inmate medical care when she clearly had extremely delicate and 
complicated medical needs.71  Prison guards intentionally interfered with 
that inmate’s treatment by ignoring her cries that she was in labor and 
denied her access to medical care by keeping her locked in her cell.72  
While the case of Terra K. may not be facially unconstitutional under the 
standard set forth in Estelle, it violates the Eighth Amendment, because 
prison guards inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by denying Terra K. 
access to medical care.73 
Another example of a constitutional violation is the previously 
mentioned case of Joan S.74  By the time prison guards actually allowed 
Joan access to medical care, her doctor informed her that her fetus’s skull 
had collapsed.75  Prison guards violated Joan’s Eighth Amendment right, as 
they delayed taking her to the hospital and her acquisition of proper 
medical attention.76  Prison guards violated the standard set forth in Estelle 
entitling prisoners to medical care by forcing Joan to carry her dead child 
for several days, an obvious health emergency that requires urgent medical 
attention.77 
                                                          
 69. See id. (noting that so long as the shackling of a prisoner is not an accident, any 
time that shackling of a prisoner interferes with, denies, or delays a pregnant inmate’s 
access to medical care, under Estelle, it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 70. See Roth, supra note 3 (recounting the case of an inmate in Dubuque County 
Jail in Iowa where no one noticed her giving birth). 
 71. See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (noting that it is a clear mark of human 
decency—which the Court lays out as a necessary element of determining deliberate 
indifference—to render assistance to a woman in labor). 
 72. See id. (noting that prisoners cannot care for themselves by reason of their 
deprivation of liberty, and so they depend on the state for proper care). 
 73. See id. (using the Supreme Court’s standard that wanton infliction of 
unnecessary pain violates the Eighth Amendment, and holding that forcing a woman to 
give birth in her cell alone clearly constitutes wanton infliction of unnecessary pain). 
 74. See Roth, supra note 3 (recounting how Joan sought medical attention for two 
weeks because she was near her due date and leaking amniotic fluid). 
 75. See id. (stating that doctors told Joan that the death of her fetus was a direct 
result of the loss of all her amniotic fluid and that she was at severe risk of septic shock 
the longer the dead fetus was inside her). 
 76. See id. (observing that prison guards were clearly aware of Joan’s medical 
condition and intentionally delayed taking her to a hospital, preventing access to 
necessary medical attention). 
 77. See id. (noting that such a severe infliction of pain and suffering clearly violates 
the cruel and unusual punishment provision proscribed by the Eighth Amendment). 
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 Officials were deliberately indifferent when they denied Joan medical care 
by refusing to take her to a doctor despite her repeated pleas; delayed 
taking her to a hospital; forced her to carry her dead fetus; and delayed 
getting her a necessary shot associated with her rare blood type that would 
help prevent complications with future pregnancies.78  The behavior of the 
jail officials in the case of Joan S. is a flagrant violation of her Eighth 
Amendment rights, and a clear deprivation of her constitutionally protected 
right to medical care.79 
The act of chaining pregnant inmates to hospital beds during labor 
constitutes deliberate indifference to the prisoners’ medical needs.80  
Restricting a woman’s movement while she is in labor exacerbates the pain 
and distress associated with the birthing process, and may lead to 
complications that pose serious risks to the lives and health of both the 
mother and her baby.81  Further, the shackling of inmates during labor 
serves no legitimate objective because, although they are convicted felons, 
it is extremely difficult—and in some cases impossible—for pregnant 
inmates to either try and escape or pose a safety risk.82  Indeed, shackling a 
woman to a bed during childbirth serves no justifiable penological purpose, 
as her being pregnant would have no relevance on her sentence.83  
Shackling during labor could have no deterrent effect on the original crime, 
and thereby punishes the prisoner for bearing children, not for breaking the 
law.84 
While the Eighth Circuit ultimately found that shackling violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, 
Nelson’s ordeal also invokes a claim under the Estelle standard.85  Prison 
officials refused to take Nelson to a hospital to give birth until she was 
                                                          
 78. See id. at 103 (applying the Estelle standard, the jail officials’ deliberate 
indifference to Joan’s serious illness constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, 
violating the Eighth Amendment). 
 79. See id. at 103 (noting that the pain and suffering Joan experienced served no 
penological purpose). 
 80. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 23 
(stating that such measures exacerbates the dangers of the childbearing process). 
 81. See id. (providing that an obligation not to put inmates in a situation of elevated 
risk or purposefully cause a heightened and unnecessary amount of pain). 
 82. See Allen, supra note 6 (stating that if a woman has been given epidural 
anesthesia, the numbness makes it impossible for her to run off). 
 83. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 530 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(noting the argument that the shackling of inmates serves a security interest). 
 84. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 3 
(arguing that there is no legitimate punitive correlation between the original crime for 
which the prisoner is incarcerated, and shackling her during childbirth). 
 85. See generally Nelson, 583 F.3d at 522 (upholding that shackling violates the 
Constitution because it is an Eighth Amendment violation and because it infringes on a 
prisoner’s constitutionally protected right to medical care). 
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already in active labor.86  Nelson was still in leg shackles when she started 
to deliver her baby, despite the repeated pleas of doctors and nurses to 
remove the shackles.87 
While decided under a different standard, Nelson clearly exhibits a 
violation of a prisoner’s constitutionally protected right to medical care.88  
When applying the standard of deliberate indifference to a serious medical 
need, as in the Estelle case, it is clear that Nelson was not subject to 
humane conditions of confinement.89  The prison infirmary nurse denied 
and delayed Nelson’s access to medical care by sending her back to her cell 
despite her nearing active labor.90  Further, the officer stationed on duty in 
Nelson’s delivery room displayed deliberate indifference when she refused 
to remove the shackles despite the requests of medical professionals.91  By 
refusing to transport Nelson to the hospital in a timely manner, and refusing 
to remove the shackles at the request of medical professionals causing 
unnecessary bodily harm, the prison guards intentionally interfered with 
Nelson’s access to medical care.92 This violated her constitutionally 
protected right to medical care.93  In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that 
denying, delaying, or inhibiting a prisoner’s access to medical care 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.94  Under this standard shackling 
is unconstitutional because, as was seen in Nelson, the act of shackling 
clearly delays and inhibits a prisoner’s access to medical care.95 
                                                          
 86. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Services, 104CV00037 JMM-JWC, 2007 WL 
1703562, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2007) (recalling how Nelson had repeatedly 
asked to be taken to the hospital and the infirmary nurse denied her request), rev’d in 
part, 533 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 583 F.3d 522 (8th 
Cir. 2009). 
 87. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 526. (explaining that as a result of the shackles, every 
time Nelson experienced a labor contraction her leg would cramp up and she would 
experience severe pain, ultimately causing a dislocated hip). 
 88. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (showing that Nelson suffered 
as a direct result of the deliberate indifference of the prison officials). 
 89. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (noting the adequate satisfaction of the objective 
and subjective tests, and that the deliberate indifference to Nelson’s medical needs 
caused cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment). 
 90. See Nelson, 2007 WL 1703562, at *2-3 (explaining the importance in taking a 
woman to a hospital once she reaches active labor to help ensure no delivery 
complications occur). 
 91. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (declaring that the officer’s refusal to remove the 
shackles impeded with the birthing process and caused severe undue pain and 
suffering, resulting in a hernia and dislocated hip). 
 92. See id. at 529 (applying the holding in Estelle that denying or delaying a 
prisoner’s access to medical care is cruel and unusual punishment). 
 93. See id. at 529, 531 (stating that these actions resulted in a wanton infliction of 
unnecessary pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 94. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (noting the obligation of prison officials to ensure 
that the Constitutional rights of prisoners remain intact during incarceration). 
 95. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 526 (stating that shackling caused Nelson unnecessary 
injuries, and that doctors could not properly attend to her due to her restrains, thus 
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B.  Shackling is Unconstitutional In Violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
1.  Shackling Laws Are Unconstitutional Under Nelson v. Correctional 
Medical Services. 
Pregnancy and labor are serious medical conditions.96  As is established 
in Estelle, failing to provide care for a serious medical condition is a 
constitutional violation.97  Therefore, policies permitting the shackling of 
pregnant inmates during childbirth violate the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, which prohibits inflicting cruel and unusual 
punishment.98 
In Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, the court touched on the 
asserted security interests justifying shackling.99  Not only does the act of 
shackling exhibit a deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical needs, 
but in Nelson, and all other shackling cases, there is no competing 
institutional need or penological interest served by the practice.100  
Arguably, shackling would be permissible if it served some legitimate 
objective, such as public safety.101  However, it is reasonable to assume that 
no woman while in labor poses a flight risk.102  Thus, the policy of 
shackling pregnant inmates during childbirth clearly does not provide the 
requisite valid connection between prison regulations and the legitimate 
governmental interests put forward to justify it.103  It is illogical to have 
                                                          
inhibiting her access to medical care). 
 96. See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n., Fact Sheet: The Family and 
Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (July 6, 2000), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/fmlaada.html (stating that while pregnancy is not a 
disability under the ADA, it is considered a serious condition under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act). 
 97. See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97 (holding that infringing on a prisoner’s 
Constitutionally protected right to medical care constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
 98. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (noting that ignoring 
the medical needs of prisoners causes undue pain and suffering, delays access to 
medical care, and often inhibits necessary medical attention). 
 99. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 530-31 (8th Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (supposing the security interest to be the possibility of an inmate fleeing from the 
hospital while in labor). 
 100. See id. (stating that there was no evidence in Nelson’s case to suggest that she 
would flee or pose a security threat). 
 101. See id. at 533 (discussing the regulatory exception that would potentially allow 
a corrections officer to shackle an inmate after delivery if there is clear and convincing 
evidence that she poses a serious safety risk to herself, hospital staff, or the officer). 
 102. See id. at 531 (noting that Nelson was under the supervision of an experienced 
correctional officer who was equipped with a fire arm, and that this is a sufficient form 
of security). 
 103. But cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86, 91 (1987) (noting however, that 
security and prevention of escape are legitimate governmental interests). 
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genuine concerns that a woman in active labor poses a legitimate security 
risk or would try to escape.104 
A complaint must show two elements to successfully allege an Eighth 
Amendment violation: 1) an objective standard, determining whether the 
prisoner filing suit had a serious medical need or faced a risk to their health 
or safety; and 2) a subjective standard, analyzing whether the prison 
official had knowledge of the need or risk but ignored it.105  The Nelson 
court found the objective and subjective prongs of the Eighth Amendment 
standard easily satisfied.106  First, expert medical testimony satisfied the 
objective standard when the doctor witness declared that it is always 
dangerous to shackle a woman during the final stages of labor.107  Second, 
statements from prison guard demonstrated her actual knowledge of risk to 
the shackled prisoner and satisfied the subjective component of the Eighth 
Amendment standard.108  Moreover, evidence that, as a result of being 
shackled while in labor, Nelson soiled her bed sheets, causing her actual 
discomfort and humiliation, and subjecting her to the risk of infection, 
further satisfied the subjective standard.109  The court also noted that an 
officer had been present while the nurses were attempting to help the 
prisoner push her baby through the birth canal, and that medical personnel 
had repeatedly asked for the removal of the shackles.110  Further, since the 
prisoner was not a flight risk, she clearly established that the government 
could not reasonably claim that her case warranted shackling.111 
Applying Nelson’s holding, other cases are also obviously 
unconstitutional.112  For example, in the case of Desiree C., prison guards 
rushed her to the hospital with one ankle chained to a gurney, with 
contractions every three minutes.113  She had an emergency C-section, and 
                                                          
 104. Cf. Allen, supra note 6 (stating that the majority of convictions of pregnant 
inmates are for non-violent crimes). 
 105. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (stipulating that there must be clear and convincing 
evidence to satisfy these elements). 
 106. See id. (stating that the elements involve a showing of an excessive risk of 
substantial harm). 
 107. See id. (relying on the testimony given at trial by an expert in the field of 
obstetrics and gynecology). 
 108. See id. (finding that the jury could find that Officer Turensky knew of the risk 
to Nelson simply because of the obviousness of the risk). 
 109. See id. at 526 (explaining that Nelson’s injuries prevent her from participating 
in many activities and that she was advised not to have more children as a result of her 
injuries). 
 110. See id. at 530 (observing no justification for continuing to shackle after 
repeated requests on the part of medical personnel to unshackle the prisoner). 
 111. See id. at 522 (noting that there needs to be clear and convincing evidence of 
flight risk). 
 112. See id. (applying a standard of deliberate indifference). 
 113. See Karen de Sá, Legislation Calls for an End to Cuffing Women During 
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when she awoke from general anesthesia she spent four days in recovery, 
shackled to a bed and under the watch of an armed guard.114  The shackles 
made physical recovery more difficult, as her doctor instructed her to get 
up and walk to help her stomach muscles heal.115 
When applying the Nelson standard to this situation, it is clear that the 
prison officials violated Desiree’s constitutional rights, as they showed a 
clear deliberate indifference to her situation.116  Under Nelson, Desiree had 
a clearly established right to not be shackled, as there was no clear and 
convincing evidence that she was a flight risk.117  Further, Desiree was not 
subject to humane conditions of confinement as prescribed under Nelson, 
as she had to walk to aid her recovery while still in shackles.118  Under the 
standards set forth in Nelson, Desiree experienced deliberate indifference 
with regards to her medical condition and unnecessary pain and suffering 
from the shackling, thus violating her Eighth Amendment rights.119 
The existence of the obvious and simple alternative of supervising 
pregnant inmates during childbirth, which many states are already doing, 
and the lack of a logical connection between the goals of security and 
prevention of escape and the policy permitting the shackling of pregnant 
inmates during childbirth, demonstrate that this common practice and 
prison policy is unconstitutional.120 
                                                          
Labor, MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.november.org/stayinfor/breaking3/ShacklingWomen.html (noting that 
contractions that are three minutes apart constitute active labor). 
 114. See id. (stating that while the prisoner had an emergency C-section, the baby 
still died). 
 115. See id. (noting that the shackles around the prisoner’s ankles seriously impeded 
her ability to walk, as she was instructed to do so by her physician). 
 116. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 522 (noting that it often takes several hours to reach 
active labor, and as such prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 
medical needs if she did not arrive at the hospital until she was already in active labor, 
meaning officials delayed her access to medical care). 
 117. See de Sá, supra note 113 (noting that Desiree was under anesthesia as part of 
her emergency C-section, making it impossible for her to flee the hospital). 
 118. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (noting that the pain and restricted position of 
confinement caused by the shackles brought unnecessary discomfort and humiliation 
upon Nelson). 
 119. See id. at 531-32 (reasoning that the right to not be shackled is constitutionally 
protected). 
 120. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (holding that prison 
regulations may amount to a constitutional violation if there are easy alternatives 
indicating that the current regulation may be unreasonable), with AMNESTY INT’L USA, 
NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE: VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN 
CUSTODY 11-12 (1999) 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/019/1999/en/7588269a-e33d-11dd-
808b-bfd8d459a3de/amr510191999en.pdf (presenting clear alternatives for the 
amendment of policies regarding state use of restraints during child birth that infringe 
less upon the civil rights of pregnant prisoners). 
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2.  The Court in Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia Should Have 
Found That Shackling Laws are Unconstitutional. 
In Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, the appellate court erred in 
reversing the trial court and should have declared the practice of shackling 
unconstitutional.121  This would have been a perfect opportunity for the 
court to establish a clear standard with regards to the law.122  The court 
should have let the standard set forth by the trial court stand, for had it done 
so there would be a firm standard in case law declaring shackling illegal 
and in violation of the Eighth Amendment.123  Instead, the decision leaves 
the power to administer remedies for shackling in the hands of local D.C. 
courts.124  However, this is insufficient, as it not only leaves D.C. without 
any anti-shackling laws, but also provides ample opportunity for an uneven 
application of a remedy.125 
In Women Prisoners I, the trial court found the shackling of pregnant 
women to be a violation of federal law.126  The trial court was correct in 
ordering the appellants to hire a nurse midwife to provide services, 
establish a pre-natal clinic, and arrange for obstetrical examinations within 
women’s prisons.127  However, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit made a grave error in dissolving the 
injunction.128  By doing so, the Court of Appeals left D.C. without a strict 
anti-shackling standard.129  The Court of Appeals reasoned that because 
courts have little experience in running a prison, they should give deference 
                                                          
 121. See generally Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (noting that while the main focus of the case was prison conditions, the court 
could have left intact the lower court’s ruling regarding the shackling of female 
prisoners). 
 122. But see AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 
321 (noting that D.C. still has no legislation limiting the use of shackles on pregnant 
inmates). 
 123. See Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 931-32 (inhibiting the establishment of an 
actual standard, rather than simply leaving a potential remedy in such cases at the 
discretion of the courts of the District of Columbia). 
 124. See id. (noting the reticence of the Court of Appeals to establish a standard on a 
new and ambiguous law). 
 125. Cf. id. (making it more difficult for women who have been shackled to seek a 
remedy because of the absence of an actual standard). 
 126. See id. at 916 (reviewing the lower court’s holding that shackling violates the 
Eighth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). 
 127. See id. at 923 (establishing these measures as minimums in ob/gyn care in 
prisons). 
 128. See id. (stating that while these measures may be highly desirable, the Supreme 
Court has warned against such detailed orders because they circumvent the authority of 
local legislatures). 
 129. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 321 
(noting that D.C. has no legislation limiting shackling). 
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to prison officials where possible.130  The court erred in making this ruling, 
as it created a self-regulating system for prisons.131  In vacating the order 
for gynecological care, the Court of Appeals left pregnant inmates 
defenseless against inhumane treatment and improper medical care.132  The 
court leaves the regulation of caring for pregnant prisoners to local D.C. 
Code, which has no formal provisions regarding shackling.133  As such, the 
Court of Appeals aided the furtherance of an unconstitutional system by 
leaving the practice of shackling unregulated and with no form of a legal 
check on the system.134 
C.  Illinois, California, and New York Have All Outlawed Shackling and 
Other States Should Follow Their Model and Move Towards Passing 
Legislation that Also Outlaws Shackling. 
In addition to violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment, shackling also violates state statutes 
requiring a minimum standard of care for prisoners.135  Even worse than the 
minimal number of state laws regulating the treatment of incarcerated 
women during childbirth is the complete absence of a federal law aimed at 
protecting pregnant women in prison.136  States such as California, Illinois, 
and New York, chose to forego litigation in favor of a legislative 
solution.137 
                                                          
 130. See Women Prisoners III, 93 F.3d at 931-32 (regarding the running of the 
prisons, program implementation, and prison upkeep). 
 131. Cf. id. (assuming—incorrectly—that prisons will always act in the best interest 
of the prisoner). 
 132. See id. (vacating the order of the trial court, and leaving as recompense only the 
ability for appellees to renew their arguments to the court regarding the substandard 
medical care). 
 133. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 321 
(ignoring D.C.’s lack of legislation banning shackling). 
 134. See Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 931-32 (leaving the regulation of the prisons 
up to the prison officials themselves, basing the regulation of shackling on non-existent 
D.C. law, and providing no legal remedy for clear Eighth Amendment violations). 
 135. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 6030(e)-(f) (West 2011) (calling for prenatal and 
postpartum care for pregnant inmates, as well as prohibiting shackling of prisoners who 
are in labor), with N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2011) (prohibiting restraints 
on prisoners who are in labor, except under extraordinary circumstances, during which 
they may be cuffed by one wrist); see also Liptak, supra note 25 (stating that the New 
York law is very similar to those enacted by California and Illinois). 
 136. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 328 
(observing that there is no U.S. Bureau of Prisons legislation nor an agency policy that 
bans the shackling of pregnant inmates). 
 137. See Liptak, supra note 25 (commenting on a New York bill similar to statutes 
enacted by California and Illinois, that has subsequently been adopted). 
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1.  Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by the Illinois Law and 
Enact Laws Banning Shackling. 
In 2000, the Illinois legislature amended the state’s Unified Code of 
Corrections to add an anti-shackling provision.138  The revised statute 
clearly lays out the standard that prohibits restraints on an inmate in labor 
during any point of her transport or delivery.139 
Unfortunately, despite the strict shackling prohibitions in Illinois law, the 
practice is still widely used, and the case of Latiana Walton is just one 
example of the gross disobedience of these crucial laws.140  Walton—
another non-violent offender—had an arm and leg chained to her bed 
during labor, and wrist handcuffed throughout the entire delivery.141  The 
Illinois Unified Code of Corrections clearly states that when a pregnant 
inmate is brought to a hospital for the purposes of giving birth, under no 
circumstances may handcuffs, shackles, or restraints of any kind can be 
used during labor.142  The statute does allow for the posting of a 
correctional officer immediately outside the delivery room, but even this is 
disregarded, and corrections officers often stay in the delivery room.143 
The case of Latiana exhibits a gross violation of not only Illinois state 
law regarding the minimum standard of care for inmates and the use of 
shackles on pregnant inmates during delivery, but also a person’s 
constitutionally protected Eighth Amendment right against cruel and 
unusual punishment.144 
Other states, such as Louisiana, which currently have no legislation 
limiting the use of shackles on pregnant inmates and allows restraints on 
inmates in the third trimester as well as during transport and labor, should 
adopt the Illinois standards.145  Louisiana could easily adopt certain 
                                                          
 138. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (West 2011) (stating that when a pregnant 
female is brought to a hospital for the purposes of delivering her baby, no shackles, 
handcuffs, or restraints of any kind may be used). 
 139. See id. (noting the absence of language that allows for shackling if a guard feels 
that the inmate is a security risk, providing a much stricter anti-shackling standard). 
 140. See Mastony, supra note 2 (noting that Illinois passed anti-shackling legislation 
in 1999, and twelve years later, it is still disregarded). 
 141. See id. (stating that Walton’s original charge was for retail theft, and her 
incarceration stemmed from missing a court date). 
 142. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (noting that prohibitions on shackling apply 
during transportation to the hospital and delivery). 
 143. See Mastony, supra note 2 (recounting the case of Melissa Hall, an inmate who 
was not only shackled during delivery, but also had a guard sitting in her room 
watching the NBA finals during the entirety of her labor). 
 144. See id. (showing a willful disregard on the part of the corrections officer since 
the officer repeatedly ignored the doctor’s request that Walton’s shackles be removed). 
 145. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 137 
(stating that Louisiana allows four and five point restrains on pregnant inmates and 
allows for the application of leg irons and handcuffs during delivery). 
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provisions from the Illinois statute—such as prohibiting leg irons on a 
woman in labor—making its current laws illegal.146  The legislative intent 
of the Illinois anti-shackling legislation is to protect the well-being of the 
child and mother, and to not inflict any undue pain or suffering caused by 
shackling.147  States such as Louisiana should strive to enforce this 
objective within their own legislation.148 
A clear example of where shackling caused undue pain and suffering in 
Louisiana is the case of Joe Doe B., where corrections officers left her in 
shackles after she went into labor.149  Under Illinois law, the Louisiana law 
is unconstitutional, as Illinois strictly prohibits the use of shackles during 
active labor.150  Shackling during active labor is unconstitutional because it 
serves no legitimate purpose and causes undue pain and suffering.151 
2.  Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by California Law and 
Enact Laws Banning Shackling. 
In 2005, the California Legislature followed Illinois’ example by passing 
an anti-shackling provision.152  The legislature’s decision to ban the 
practice of shackling prisoners adheres to United Nations policy.153  The 
                                                          
 146. See id. (noting that the ACLU has filed a lawsuit in Louisiana regarding the 
Orleans Parish Prison’s policy of keeping women shackled during labor). 
 147. Cf. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (showing how a revision of the full Unified 
Code of Corrections and the penal code of Illinois exhibits a philosophical shift in the 
legislature, the recognition of the barbarity of the practice, and the necessity to 
implement anti-shackling provisions in all sections of Illinois law). 
 148. See id. (allowing the pregnant prisoner to have the freedom of movement she 
needs to deliver her baby while also ensuring that she is adequately monitored by 
prison officers). 
 149. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 138 
(noting that Louisiana policy is to place a guard outside the delivery room door, which 
serves the legitimate safety interest in question without causing undue pain and 
suffering). 
 150. Cf. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7; AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN 
CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 112 (stating that in addition to its anti-shackling efforts, 
Illinois also has programs in place for inmate mothers and their infants where the child 
can reside with the mother until he or she is one year old). 
 151. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (showing the state’s obligatory interest in the 
care of prisoners by making the Sherriff responsible for providing adequate personnel 
to monitor the health of the inmate). 
 152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011); see AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF 
WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 61 (showing that, prior to the implementation of 
the 2006 law, California had no policy that prevented female prisoners from being 
shackled to their hospital beds during labor and throughout their hospital stay). 
 153. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 22 
(recommending that pregnant inmates taken to a hospital for the purposes of giving 
birth shall not be shackled by the ankles, wrists, or both); see also California 
Legislature Considering Bill That Would Ban Shackling of Prison Inmates During 
Childbirth, MED. NEWS. TODAY, AUG. 2, 2005, 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/28474.php (noting that the previous 
justification for shackling inmates during labor was a public safety issue and to prevent 
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legislature’s reliance on the United Nations policy against shackling shows 
a clearer human rights standard than the legislation used in Illinois.154  The 
California statute states that once an inmate is in labor, she shall not be 
shackled by the ankles, wrists, or both, and that she will be transported in 
the least restrictive way possible.155 
California’s statute can extend to a state like Minnesota, which has no 
anti-shackling legislation.156  Not only does Minnesota have no legislation 
limiting the use of shackling on pregnant inmates, but the state has a 
written policy requiring that inmates be restrained during medical 
procedures and be restrained to the bed with at least one set of restraints at 
all times.157  Minnesota has the least progressive shackling laws of any 
state, requiring the use of restraints during transportation and labor, and 
requiring an officer inside the delivery room during delivery.158  All of 
these provisions should be illegal, and they could be in Minnesota if the 
state adopted the regulations of the California statute.159  If, under 
California law, it is illegal to shackle a woman during active labor, this 
standard should apply to Minnesota, making the requirement under 
Minnesota law that prisoners have at least one shackle during active labor 
unconstitutional.160  The Minnesota law flouts the legislative intent of the 
California code, disregarding all concepts of basic human dignity and 
civility, when in actuality those same elements of humanity and decency 
can, and should, be the driving force behind shackling legislation.161 
                                                          
their escape). 
 154. See California Legislature Considering Bill That Would Ban Shackling of 
Prison Inmates During Childbirth, supra note 153 (implying that United Nations 
standards are synonymous with International Human Rights standards, showing that the 
shift in legislation was morally motivated and aimed to address the issue of human 
decency). 
 155. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (stating merely that transportation must 
occur in the least restrictive way possible, and suggesting a more flexible standard), 
with 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (specifying strictly that no restraints of any kind be 
used during childbirth related transportation). 
 156. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 168-
69 (elaborating that Minnesota has no legislation limiting the use of shackling on 
pregnant inmates during the third trimester and a policy that they are to be shackled 
during labor). 
 157. See id. at 168 (noting that, according to the Minnesota Department of 
Corrections, there are no administrative rules concerning pregnancy and delivery in 
Minnesota). 
 158. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.07 (West 2011) (noting that officers will only 
partially remove shackles if requested by a doctor, and that officers are authorized to 
refuse the request all together). 
 159. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.07 (noting that Minnesota law dictates the use of 
full restraints—waist chain, black box over handcuffs and leg irons—during 
transportation of an inmate for the purpose of giving birth, which, when viewed under 
California law is clearly unconstitutional). 
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3.  Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by New York Law and 
Enact Laws Banning Shackling. 
The New York law accomplishes the same goals as its California and 
Illinois counterparts.162  The bill allows the cuffing of women by one wrist 
during transfer if they are deemed a risk, but otherwise forbids any 
mechanical restraint during transport when a woman is in labor and 
admitted to a hospital for delivery or is recovering after giving birth.163  
The justification for the Assembly bill was the recognition that New York 
was still one of the many states that permitted the shackling of pregnant 
inmates.164  In New York City, a 1990 consent decree agreement ended the 
shackling of pregnant inmates, recognizing that the use of mechanical 
restraints on a pregnant inmate constituted a cruel and inhumane form of 
punishment and posed a serious risk to both the mother and her unborn 
child.165  While New York recognized a need for cohesion in the laws of 
the entire state, other states without shackling laws should recognize the 
need to come in line with the necessary statutory provisions outlined in 
other state laws.166 
One such state that should take this step is Oklahoma, as it currently has 
no legislation limiting the use of shackling on pregnant inmates.167  
Oklahoma allows the shackling of inmates during their third trimester, 
transport to the hospital for childbirth, and during labor.168  The legislative 
intent of the New York bill easily applies to the statutes of Oklahoma.169  
When persuasively applying the authority of the New York bill, which 
                                                          
 162. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2011) (prohibiting the use of 
restraints of any kind from being used during labor). 
 163. See id. (noting that the minimal restraint during transport only applies if the 
inmate is a hazard to herself or others, or is a flight risk). 
 164. See id. (recognizing that the practice served no penological purpose as adequate 
safeguards could be implemented without the shackling of the prisoner  in addition to 
the notion that if New York enacted anti-shackling legislation that other states might 
follow suit); see also Pa. House Panel Approves Anti-Shackling Bill, PA INQUIRER, Jan. 
27, 2010, available at http://www.prisonofficer.org/pennsylvania/10639-anti-
shackling-bill.html (stating that the pending anti-shackling legislation in Pennsylvania 
is a direct result of the New York anti-shackling legislation). 
 165. See Assemb. B. 4105, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (recognizing a need 
for the laws of the entire state to strive to achieve a unified purpose and have a similar 
legislative intent). 
 166. See id. (noting that it would be easy for a state like Oklahoma to follow in the 
footsteps of a state like New York and mimic its shackling legislation). 
 167. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 241 
(noting that Oklahoma does not publish any administrative rules concerning pregnancy 
and delivery). 
 168. See id. at 242 (noting that the state also requires the presence of a corrections 
officer in the delivery room). 
 169. See Assemb. B. 4105 (applying the reasoning that too many states currently 
permit shackling of female prisoners and the practice violates the code of human 
decency). 
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clearly prohibits shackling during active labor, the practices in Oklahoma - 
such as only removing restraints during labor if the attending physician, 
head of the medical facility, and head of the correctional facility are all in 
agreement—should be illegal.170 
All three pieces of model legislation described above contain clauses that 
would allow prison officials or attending physicians to mandate the use of 
limited physical restraints in the case of a specific health or security risk.171  
The legislators in Illinois, California, and New York, however, have 
recognized an important policy paradigm shift: shackling pregnant inmates 
should be a rare exception rather than the norm, and the decision to use 
physical restraints on a woman in active labor must be made carefully and 
for justifiable reasons.172 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Preemptive legislation banning the shackling of inmates during labor and 
delivery is far superior to waiting until a legal injury occurs.173  Drafting 
legislation serves myriad purposes, such as keeping an injury from 
occurring in the first place, keeping cases out of the court system, and 
providing national guidance.174  Unfortunately, prisoners are unpopular 
with the public, politically powerless, and often legally unsophisticated.175 
Sadly, in states where shackling is illegal, the wave of lawsuits 
challenging shackling demonstrates that shackling continues to be a 
prevalent practice despite the law.176 
                                                          
 170. Compare id., with AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra 
note 4, at 242 (applying the New York statute to Oklahoma, it becomes apparent that 
the legislative intent similarly applies to Oklahoma, as the New York statute seeks to 
eliminate the prevalence of laws permitting shackling). 
 171. Accord 730 CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 
(West 2011); Assemb. B. 4105 (addressing concerns of corrections officers who justify 
shackling pregnant inmates in two major ways: 1) physical restraints restrict prisoners’ 
movements in a way that protects medical personnel and prison officers, and 2) 
prisoners are prevented from escaping). 
 172. See Assemb. B. 4105 (acknowledging the legitimate justification of public 
safety). 
 173. See Andrea Hsu, Difficult Births: Laboring and Delivering in Shackles, 
NPR.ORG, July 16, 2010, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128563037 (showing by a jury’s 
award of $1 that relief is not always easy to obtain for claims relating to shackling of 
pregnant prisoners). 
 174. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (2000) (noting that legislation would most 
importantly prevent such a gross violation of Constitutional rights). 
 175. See id. (citing reasons for why often prisoner legislation is not often 
aggressively pursued). 
 176. See Mastony, supra note 2 (reporting that since 2008 more than twenty former 
female inmates have filed lawsuits against the Cook County Sheriff’s Office alleging 
incidents of shackling while giving birth). 
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Circumstances like those in Illinois raise concerns about drafting 
effective legislation in other states.177  One notable difference between the 
statutes of New York and California versus Illinois, is that both New York 
and California include provisions that would allow for the shackling of a 
prisoner if it is deemed necessary for the safety of the inmate, the staff, or 
the public, or if the prisoner is a flight risk.178 
States such as Pennsylvania and Georgia are currently making strides 
towards establishing anti-shackling legislation.179  Under Pennsylvania’s 
Senate Bill 1074, corrections officers are still permitted to use restraints in 
extreme situations.180  This provision seems to be the mark of a 
successfully enforced piece of anti-shackling legislation.181  While Georgia 
is not as far along as Pennsylvania, it is moving towards drafting anti-
shackling legislation.182  In order to draft successful shackling legislation 
that is actually enforced, Georgia will have to specify that guards may not 
use restraints during transportation or delivery, while still allowing for 
some security provisions in extreme cases.183 
In October 2008, the Federal Bureau of Prisons issued a new policy 
mandating that inmates in labor, delivery, or post-delivery recuperation 
shall not be placed in restraints unless there are reasonable grounds to 
believe the inmate presents an immediate, serious threat of hurting herself 
or others, or there are reasonable grounds to believe the inmate presents an 
immediate and credible risk of escape.184  Similarly, in April 2008, 
                                                          
 177. See Allen, supra note 6 (recognizing that the legislation needs to be enforced, 
and therefore needs to take into consideration the justifications of the prisons such as 
public safety). 
 178. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011); Assemb. B. 4105 (providing that 
these provisions apply only in extreme circumstances). 
 179. See CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, 2010 State Legislative Wrap Up, 
available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/feature/2010-state-legislative-wrap-up 
(noting that Pennsylvania is actually in the process of enacting an anti-shackling laws, 
whereas Georgia is still in the beginning stages of building momentum for legislation). 
 180. See Pa. House Panel Approves Anti-Shackling Bill, supra note 164 (stating that 
the Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed the Healthy Birth for Incarcerated Women 
Act in a unanimous vote). 
 181. See id. (claiming that because Pennsylvania had no law banning the use of 
shackles, and so for the interest of security purposes, shackling became a default 
practice). 
 182. See Rachel Roth, AMA Opposes Shackling Pregnant Women in Labor, RH 
REALITY CHECK, June 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/node/13676 (noting that activists are very vocally 
pressing the issue). 
 183. See Our Work: Congress Passes the Second Chance Act, REBECCA PROJECT 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.rebeccaproject.org/index.php?option=com_content 
&task=view&id=236&Itemid=152 (acknowledging the need to allow for shackles in 
extreme circumstances where the safety of others may be jeopardized and to potentially 
allow a guard to be posted outside an inmate’s room). 
 184. See id. (reporting a working relationship between lawmakers and the Rebecca 
Project for Human Rights). 
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President Bush signed the Second Chance Act into law, which requires that 
all federal correctional facilities document and report the use of physical 
restraints on pregnant female prisoners during pregnancy, labor, delivery, 
and post-delivery, and justify the use of the restraints with documented 
security concerns.185 
The current patchwork system of laws, regulations, written, and 
unwritten policies has created an atmosphere of confusion and 
noncompliance.186  Even in states with legislative bans on the practice of 
shackling, there have been anecdotal reports that the practice continues to 
be employed on women during labor and delivery.187  It is not uncommon 
for changes in department of corrections’ directives or policies to go 
uncommunicated to prison guards, or for such policies to be applied with 
such discretion as to essentially permit the practice in nearly all 
circumstances.188  It is clear that while great progress has been made in the 
effort to end the shackling of incarcerated women during labor and delivery 
in the past ten years, considerably more needs to be done. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Women who have already been seriously physically injured as a result of 
the use of shackles during pregnancy and childbirth may still be able to use 
the court system to obtain monetary damages.189  However, in order to 
prevent future injury or to simply protest the practice as a human rights 
violation, female prisoners and their advocates will most likely have to turn 
to alternative methods of relief.190  In Illinois, California, and New York, 
state legislatures have severely limited the ability of prison officials to 
                                                          
 185. See Second Chance Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 17501 et seq. (Supp. 2008) (adding extra 
restrictions to disincentivize the practice, such as ensuring that facilities provide 
Congress with explanations regarding the reasons for using restraints in particular 
instances). 
 186. Richard Winton, Jail Care for Women is Criticized, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2008, 
at B3 (noting that even though California has a state law prohibiting the use of 
shackling of a female inmate during childbirth, the Los Angeles County Jail system has 
not implemented any policies to reflect the law, and that leg chains, which are heavy 
but long enough to allow the inmate to get to the bathroom, are often present during 
childbirth). 
 187. See id. (detailing a special counsel’s investigation of the written policies of the 
Los Angeles jail system). 
 188. See Mastony, supra note 2 (noting the difficulty of enforceability of state 
statutes prohibiting shackling during childbirth due to differing interpretations of the 
word “labor”). 
 189. See Second Chance Act of 2008 (providing a much needed form of relief to 
those that can no longer bring an Eighth Amendment violation claim). 
 190. See Winton, supra note 186 (blaming a lack of relief for those injured on a 
backlog in the court systems and the complexity of stating a viable Eighth Amendment 
claim). 
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shackle pregnant or birthing prisoners.191  With the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision, there is now a federal standard declaring the practice of shackling 
unconstitutional for violating the Eighth Amendment.192  Thus, the law of 
any state that allows for the shackling of female inmates during labor or 
delivery is unconstitutional under the Nelson standard.193 
State departments of corrections and state legislators should follow the 
example set by California, Illinois, and New York and enact and implement 
state regulations and legislation to protect pregnant inmates who give birth 
while incarcerated, thus bringing the country in line with its constitutional 
obligations.194 
 
                                                          
 191. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 
(West 2011); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2011). 
 192. See generally Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(declaring shackling a form of cruel and unusual punishment). 
 193. See id. at 534 (holding that it was unconstitutional to shackle Nelson because 
the pain and suffering she experienced as a result violated her Eighth Amendment 
rights). 
 194. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 24 
(noting the obligation to be sensitive to the pregnant inmate’s health needs, and not 
inflict cruel and unusual punishment). 
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